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The 1970's ushered in a new era in the care of retarded people in the
United States. State-run institutions, long thought to be the most appro-
priate treatment facilities, were challenged by the federal government and
private organizations for constitutional violations of patients' rights to an
adequate standard of living.'
Wyatt v. Stickney2 was the first in a series of lawsuits aimed at securing
the constitutional rights of institutionalized retarded people. It also
marked the entry of the federal government into institutional litigation.
The court requested the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae3 to
help gather information, evaluate treatment programs, and assist state of-
ficials in "meeting Federal standards for adequate care."'4 Over the next
few years, the Justice Department continued to assist plaintiffs in institu-
tional suits either as litigating amicus6 or plaintiff-intervenor.6
In 1976, the federal government sought to broaden its involvement in
institutional litigation by initiating lawsuits.' The courts, however, dis-
missed the complaints, ruling that the Attorney General lacked statutory
1. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
2. In Wyatt, plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction against three state hospitals for the
mentally handicapped, alleging inadequate care and treatment of patients confined there. 325 F.
Supp. at 782; 334 F. Supp. at 1342 n.1. The court agreed that conditions at the institution deprived
patients of their constitutional right to treatment, and ordered state officials to promulgate and imple-
ment within six months a treatment program to upgrade the unconstitutional standard of care. 325 F.
Supp. at 784-86.
3. 325 F. Supp. at 786.
4. S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 787, 791.
5. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
6. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Stewart, No. 74-2412 (E.D. La. filed July 26, 1976); Gates v. Collier,
349 F. Supp. 881, 885 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 407 (E.D. Okla.
1974).
7. See United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.
1977); United States v. Mattson, No. 74-138-BU (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), affd, 600 F.2d 1295
(9th Cir. 1979).
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authority to initiate these suits.' Recognizing the need for federal partici-
pation,9 Congress responded to these dismissals by passing the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) in 1980,0 which gave
the Attorney General power to initiate actions to protect mentally handi-
capped residents in state facilities."
In the eight years since its passage, CRIPA has not fulfilled Congress'
expectations. This Note describes the failure of federal intervention under
CRIPA and proposes changes in the Act to enhance its efficacy. Section I
analyzes the remedial processes of conciliation and litigation provided for
in CRIPA and outlines the constitutional rights of institutionalized re-
tarded people. Section II discusses the record of federal intervention thus
far, focusing on the Justice Department's failure to act quickly when con-
stitutional violations have been uncovered and on the shortcomings of ne-
gotiated remedies. This Section also examines the difficulties faced by
third parties seeking to intervene in a CRIPA suit on behalf of the plain-
tiffs. Section III proposes changes in the Act necessary to eliminate the
problems encountered since CRIPA's ratification. The proposed amend-
ments aim to ensure expeditious action to correct CRIPA violations,
broaden the participation of third parties in the settlement process, and
expand the scope of monitoring in remedial decrees.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS AcT (CRIPA)
A. Remedial Processes
CRIPA authorizes the Attorney General to sue any state when he has
reason to believe that it is engaged in a "pattern or practice"' 2 which
8. Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1124-26; Mattson, 600 F.2d at 1297.
9. The resources of the federal government allow it to pursue nationwide institutional reform
more easily than can private citizens, legal services, and independent advocacy groups, who would
shoulder such responsibility if the federal government were not involved. The Attorney General can
also rely on other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Health and Human Services, to assist the Justice Department in conducting investigations of retarda-
tion facilities and preparing a case for trial. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 804.
These other groups, by contrast, lack the money and manpower necessary to proceed on a broad
scale. The Legal Services Corporation, for example, does not have enough funding even to provide
adequate representation to those living below the poverty level. The Mental Health Law Project, the
principal advocacy group of its kind in the country, employs only six full-time attorneys. Id. at 803.
These shortages, combined with the difficulties of communicating with mentally handicapped people,
commuting long distances to meet with clients, and bringing an action of such magnitude, severely
restrict the ability of such groups, acting alone, to protect retarded individuals. Id. at 802-03.
10. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) amended by Pub. L. No. 97-256 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1997 (1982)). For a summary of events leading up to the passage of CRIPA, see Dinerstein,
The Absence of Justice, 63 NEB. L. REv. 680, 683-92 (1984).
11. While CRIPA pertains to all state-run residential facilities, including prisons and institutions
for mentally handicapped people, this Note focuses on actions taken at facilities for mentally retarded
people.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a). The "pattern or practice" requirement was designed to limit causes of
action to those situations where "unconstitutional or illegal practices are widespread, pervasive, and
systematic, and adversely affect significant numbers of institutionalized individuals." S. REP. No. 416,
supra note 4, at 811. Isolated acts or injuries are thereby excluded.
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subjects residents of public institutions to "egregious or flagrant" viola-
tions 3 which contravene their federal statutory and constitutional rights. 4
Before bringing any such suit, the Attorney General must first conduct an
investigation 5 of the facility in question and inform the appropriate state
government of its results.1 In addition, the state must be notified at least
forty-nine days before suit is filed" to allow adequate time for consulta-
tion and possible resolution of problems" without the need for further
legal action.1 '
The language and legislative history of the statute indicate that litiga-
tion is appropriate in the absence of a negotiated result." Faced with the
possibility of costly litigation, a state may increase its efforts to negotiate a
settlement.2 Thus, the threat of litigation is as much a weapon as the
litigation itself.
B. Youngberg v. Romeo
CRIPA provides a framework for the protection of constitutional rights
but does not specify the rights it is designed to vindicate.2 In Youngberg
v. Romeo,23 the Supreme Court's only pronouncement on the constitu-
tional rights of institutionalized retarded people, the Court unanimously
recognized the following liberty interests protected by the due process
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a). Such violations are defined as "conditions which are willful or wanton
or conditions of gross neglect." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 811.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2). In deciding which institutions to investigate, the Justice Department
conducts a preliminary review of all complaints received and looks further into "[t]hose which on their
face appear to describe legitimate or serious concerns . . . to determine whether formal investigation
is required." STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE HANDICAPPED, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON THE INSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY DISABLED 151 (1985) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT].
16. Such notification must include the legal bases of the government's claims and the facts under-
lying them, as well as the "minimum measures" necessary to correct the infractions. 42 U.S.C. §
1997b(a)(1)(A)-(C).
17. 42 U.S.C. 1997b(a)(1).
18. Of course, the Attorney General may notify a state more than 49 days before filing suit.
Section 1997b(a)(2)(C) specifies that the Attorney General should be satisfied, before filing suit, that
state officials have had "reasonable time" to take remedial action in light of the scope of redress
requested and the urgency of the need for improvement.
19. Permitting the state to remedy conditions benefits the government by saving time and money it
would otherwise spend on litigation. In addition, the remedy proposed will be more easily enforced if
the state itself has fashioned it; a state-sponsored remedy will meet with less resistance from the
officials implementing it. Thus, it is not surprising that Congress preferred voluntary, state-sponsored
remedies wherever possible. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 832, 837; S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 814.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a). The Senate Report refers to litigation as the "single most effective
method for redressing the systematic deprivations of institutionalized persons' constitutional and Fed-
eral statutory rights." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 809. CRIPA is accordingly designed to give
the Attorney General the power to address institutional abuse "in a systematic fashion, engaging in a
program of selective litigation against those institutions where the most egregious constitutional depri-
vations affect the largest number of people." Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
21. See Dinerstein, supra note 10, at 706.
22. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Treatment in Light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 GEo.
L.J. 1785, 1802 & n.96 (1984).
23. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: the right to reasonable care and
safety,2 freedom from bodily restraint,25 adequate food, shelter, clothing,
and medical care,28  and adequate training and habilitation to ensure
safety and freedom from bodily restraint.27 In determining whether an
institution is operating in accordance with these standards, the Court held
that "decisions made by the appropriate professional [at the institution]
are entitled to a presumption of correctness." 28 Thus, the federal govern-
ment may intervene only when it has reason to question this presumption.
In such a case, CRIPA authorizes the government to send a team of legal
and medical experts into retardation facilities to determine whether there
are any Romeo violations. 9
II. THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A. The Failure To Act
CRIPA capitalized on the benefits of federal intervention while it pre-
served the state's ability to negotiate remedies. Relying solely on the pro-
cess of conciliation with state authorities, however, the federal government
did not file a single suit involving an institution for retarded people during
the first years of the Act's existence.30 Dissatisfaction with the Justice De-
partment's apparent failure to protect the rights of retarded citizens re-
sulted in congressional hearings, held in November 198331 and April
1985,32 to look into the Justice Department's efforts under CRIPA. Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge of Civil
Rights, defended the Justice Department's record at these hearings. While
he admitted that no suits had been brought, Reynolds emphasized the pro-
gress made through negotiation with state officials to remedy violations at
24. Id. at 319, 322, 324.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 324.
27. Id. at 319 n.25, 322, 324.
28. Id. at 324.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a). Some commentators have criticized the Justice Department for
refusing to vindicate certain rights-e.g., the right to treatment in the least restrictive environ-
ment-not developed by the Court in Romeo. See Note, supra note 22, at 1801-08; Dinerstein, supra
note 10, at 694-702; Cook, The Substantive Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Clients, 7
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 346 (July/August 1983), reprinted in Enforcement of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act: Institutional Care and Services for Retarded People: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 174-85 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing]. This Note, however, does not take issue with the
government's policy in this regard, nor does it criticize the Justice Department's reliance on a literal
interpretation of Romeo.
30. In fact, the first suit was not filed until 1986 in the case of United States v. New Mexico, No.
86-09-32M (D.N.M. filed Aug. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Fort Stanton].
31. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 29.
32. Examining the Issues Related to the Care and Treatment of the Nation's Institutionalized
Mentally Disabled Persons: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education and Related Agencies of the Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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By providing a reasonable opportunity for conciliation,35 Congress did
not intend to give the state unlimited time to negotiate a settlement.36 On
several occasions, however, the Justice Department has avoided bringing
suit, choosing instead to negotiate with the state for as long as is necessary
to reach an agreement." Throughout this waiting period, "[unconstitu-
tional] conditions . . . fester, destroying the purpose of federally man-
dated intervention."3
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds offered two explanations for the
Justice Department's reluctance to litigate: the desire to minimize conflict
between the state and federal governments 39 and concern that litigation is
time consuming.4° While minimizing discord is a legitimate objective, it
must nevertheless remain secondary to the fundamental purpose of these
negotiations: the elimination of unconstitutional conditions. The framers
of the Act intended no less in emphasizing the need for litigation where
conciliation produces no results within a "reasonable time. '"
The claim that litigation should be avoided because it may unneces-
sarily prolong unconstitutional conditions seems misguided for two rea-
sons. First, when CRIPA was originally passed, one justification offered
for extending the federal government's authority was the positive effect its
presence would have on the speed of litigation.' 2 It is thus inappropriate
to refuse to litigate because the process might be lengthy; to justify such
refusal, the Justice Department needs concrete proof of the protracted na-
ture of CRIPA litigation. Secondly, the conciliation policy favored by the
33. 1983 Hearing, supra note 29, at 16 (prepared statement of Wm. Bradford Reynolds).
34. Id. at 17.
35. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
36. The legislative history specifies, in fact, that the Attorney General need not "wait months or
years between the initial notification of commencement of an investigation and the filing of suit." S.
REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 815; see also Dinerstein, supra note 10, at 706 (emphasizing concilia-
tion to the exclusion of litigation "turns history on its head").
37. See infra text accompanying notes 43-55.
38. STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
39. Litigation is avoided at all costs in the interest of achieving an "absolute minimum of State-
Federal legal confrontation." 1983 Hearing, supra note 29, at 5 (testimony of Win. Bradford
Reynolds).
40. Litigation only "bog[s] the Government down," id. at 5 (testimony of Win. Bradford Reyn-
olds), and forces institutionalized residents to wait years "for court battles to unfold before real relief
comes .... " Id. at 16 (prepared statement of Win. Bradford Reynolds).
41. See supra note 18.
42. The Justice Department's expertise would ensure a high standard of representation for the
plaintiff class and could result in a notable conservation of judicial resources. The preparation of a
"tightly structured" case could accelerate the pace of litigation and/or settlement, "thus saving weeks
or months of discovery and trial." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 805.
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Justice Department does not indicate that such conciliation is a "speedy"
alternative to litigation.
2. The Problems of Conciliation
The government's failure to litigate would not frustrate CRIPA's pur-
pose if its program of conciliation produced quick and effective remedies.
Negotiations, however, have continued for years before realizing any con-
crete results. For example, at Oregon's Fairview Training Center, the
state Attorney General refused a Justice Department request for access to
the institution to conduct on-site inspections in mid-1983. The federal
government did not seek injunctive relief, however, until July 28, 1986,"'
three years after the initial inquiry into conditions at the facility. Similar
delays have occurred in other cases. In the case involving the Wheat Ridge
Regional Center in Colorado,"' the government notified the state of un-
constitutional conditions in December 1984. It was not until July 1986,
however, that the state and federal governments incorporated their agree-
ment into a consent decree.45 Residents of the Belle Chase State School in
Louisiana suffered a similar time lag. The Attorney General informed the
Governor of "egregious and flagrant conditions" at the school in January
1986; the consent decree was not finalized until July 1987.46
The Fairview and, to a lesser extent, Wheat Ridge and Belle Chase
scenarios are the types of situations CRIPA was designed to eliminate.
Giving broad powers to the Justice Department was thought to be an
effective way of challenging intransigence at the state level, albeit in as
cooperative a manner as possible. Instead, the government has acted on its
authority by waiting for states to remedy the problems.
The Rosewood Center in Owing Mills, Maryland 47 presents perhaps
the most powerful example of the problems which have resulted from the
government's reliance on conciliation. A Senate investigatory team found
43. United States v. Oregon, No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. filed July 28, 1986) [hereinafter Fairview].
44. United States v. Colorado, No. 86-F-1470 (D. Colo. filed July 10, 1986) [hereinafter Wheat
Ridge].
45. Consent decrees have been widely used in institutional reform litigation to avoid lengthy dis-
covery and to involve the defendant in the remedial process. See Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Modi-
fication of Consent Decrees]; Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent De-
crees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 898-901. For addi-
tional background on consent decrees, see Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent
Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; James, Consent Judg-
ments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1959); Comment, Consent Decrees and the
Judicial Function, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 312 (1970); Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument
of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1959). For a thorough analysis of the
consent decree negotiated in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, see D.
ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 127-253 (R. Mnookin ed. 1984).
46. See Consent Decree, United States v. Louisiana, No. 87-025, at 2, § 8. (E.D. La. July 23,
1987) [hereinafter Belle Chase].




that "[t]he time lag between the finding of unconstitutional conditions at
Rosewood and the settlement . . . shows, at the very least, that the [Jus-
tice] Department's conciliatory approach . . has the potential to negate
the type of federal involvement . . . envisioned and mandated in
CRIPA." '48 So averse was the government to confrontation with the state
that it allowed life-threatening conditions to linger for years at the institu-
tion. The "forty-nine-day" letter to Governor Hughes indicated the grav-
ity of the alleged violations, which included the following: the rape of six
severely handicapped residents by an intruder, the sexual abuse of a male
resident by an employee, "nonconsensual sexual contact" between one res-
ident and "at least one and possibly three" others, and two deaths-one
by drowning when the resident was left unattended in the bathtub and
another by exposure to the cold when a resident "managed to . . .escape
from Rosewood." 9 The government's letter, however, did not require
Rosewood to eliminate the conditions that gave rise to these events;50 it
asked only that the state reduce the level of abuse and neglect, encourage
staff members to report instances of abuse to institutional authorities, and
decrease the incidence of resident-to-resident abuse.5" The attitude engen-
dered by these instructions is antithetical both to the Justice Department's
duty to advocate in the best interests of the class members it represents
and to the requirement in CRIPA that the "forty-nine-day" letter specify
"the minimum measures [necessary to] remedy the alleged conditions and
the alleged pattern or practice of resistance."52
The delays apparent in Rosewood and other cases contrast with the
government's more expeditious action on other occasions. In its action
against the Southbury Training School in Connecticut,5" less than one
year passed between the issuance of the "forty-nine-day letter" to Gover-
nor O'Neill and the negotiation of a remedial decree. Similarly, the gov-
ernment filed suit only seven months after notifying the governor of New
Mexico of conditions at the Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School."
The Justice Department felt that New Mexican officials had had a rea-
sonable amount of time to correct the violations and had failed to do so."
48. STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 169.
49. 1983 Hearing, supra note 29, at 66 (letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds to Maryland Gov-
ernor Hughes dated Feb. 10, 1982).
50. Such a mandate is necessary to fulfill CRIPA's underlying purpose which is to "ensure that
institutionalized citizens will be afforded the full measure of protections guaranteed them by the
Constitution of the United States." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 790 (emphasis added).
51. 1983 Hearing, supra note 29, at 70 (letter from Win. Bradford Reynolds to Maryland Gov-
ernor Hughes dated Feb. 10, 1982).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(1)(C) (1982) (emphasis added).
53. United States v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D. Conn. filed July 25, 1986) [hereinafter
Southbury].
54. See Fort Stanton, supra note 30.
55. The state had rejected a formal settlement proposal and refused otherwise to remedy the Ro-
meo violations-e.g., failure to provide adequate medical care, unreasonable use of bodily re-
straints-alleged by the government. Memorandum from Win. Bradford Reynolds to Attorney Gen-
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If the Justice Department can move as quickly as it did in Southbury and
Fort Stanton, residents at other institutions are entitled to action which is
equally expeditious.
B. The Failure of Acting
The failure of the government to act in a timely fashion represents only
half of the problem. There are also some serious doubts about the benefit
to retarded citizens of specific measures taken by the federal government.
The consent decrees it has negotiated may appear, at first blush, to rem-
edy alleged violations, but the failure to provide for effective enforcement
both within and outside of the institution substantially undermines their
utility.
1. Inadequate Decrees
This problem is best illustrated by the treatment of two issues in con-
sent decrees: community placement and monitoring. The Supreme Court56
has not found a constitutional right to community placement 5  or even
placement in the "least restrictive environment;" thus, the state is not re-
quired to depopulate its institutions nor is the government required to
press for community placement quotas. However, in fulfillment of its ad-
vocacy responsibilities, the federal government must ensure that if resi-
dents are placed out of the institution, they are placed in facilities whose
care and treatment conforms to constitutional standards.
The decrees do not satisfy this burden. They make community place-
ment an optional means of meeting resident/staff ratios58 and leave the
selection of residents, where specified, to "professional staff" at the insti-
tution.59 This scheme is dangerous in that it allows residents to be relo-
cated in facilities which may provide substandard, unconstitutional care
because they are not governed by the terms of the consent decree., 0
As it now stands, Southbury, Wheat Ridge, Belle Chase and Rosewood
are free to place their residents anywhere they choose. The federal gov-
eral Meese (July 25, 1986) (discussing Fort Stanton).
56. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the Court did not reach the issue of community
placement or placement in the "least restrictive environment." Since the Justice Department relies on
a literal reading of Romeo to structure its advocacy, it has not felt compelled to vindicate a right to
placement outside of the institution.
57. The Second Circuit explicity rejected a right to community placement in Society of Goodwill
to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1247-49 (2d Cir. 1984).
58. Consent Decree, Southbury, supra note 53, at 9, § IV(3); Consent Decree, Wheat Ridge,
supra note 44, at 5, § IV(1); Consent Decree, Belle Chase, supra note 46, at 8, § IV(3); Consent
Decree, Rosewood, supra note 47, at 5, § IV(1).
59. Consent Decree, Southbury, supra note 53, at 9, § IV(3); Consent Decree, Belle Chase, supra
note 46, at 8, § IV(3); Consent Decree, Rosewood, supra note 47, at 5, § IV(1).
60. The monitoring of community placements is "critical in order to prevent the problems of
abuse and neglect . . . from following mentally retarded people from the institution into the commu-
nity." STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 195.
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ernment has failed to specify what constitutes acceptable placement. After
stating that community placement was an acceptable, albeit voluntary,
means of meeting staffing quotas, the federal government, as counsel for
the plaintiff class, should have moved under CRIPA to protect the class'
interests by promulgating standards in the event the state chose to use the
community placement option.61
The government is aware of the need for guidelines. In CARC v.
Thorne,62 a privately initiated suit involving Connecticut's Mansfield
Training School in which the government participated as amicus curiae,
an entire portion of the decree63 is devoted to outlining the standards for
community placement." In addition to promulgating standards for choos-
ing community facilities, the Mansfield decree provides for the develop-
ment of a "quality assurance system" to monitor residences' compliance
with constitutional and statutory requirements.65 The Southbury, Wheat
Ridge, Belle Chase, and Rosewood decrees contain no such provision.
Thus, even if the state, through its own initiative, were meticulous in
choosing facilities which offered the highest standard of care, there would
be no guarantee that residents placed there would receive such high qual-
ity services indefinitely.
The absence of provisions relating to the monitoring of placements is
part of a bigger problem. The decrees fail to provide for any independent
monitoring body to ensure compliance;6" instead, they leave these respon-
61. The government's duty was all the more imperative in Southbury, where during negotiations
the state made clear its intention to deinstitutionalize residents. Interview with Dr. Robert Griffith,
former Director of Southbury Training School (March 1987) [hereinafter Griffith interview]; see also
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene of CARC et al. at 6, Southbury, supra note 53.
This intention was finalized in the state's proposed consent decree implementation plan which pro-
vides for the relocation of approximately 400 residents during the first four years that the plan is in
effect. Proposed Consent Decree Implementation Plan at 62, Southbury, supra note 53.
62. No. H-78-653 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1983).
63. As non-litigating amicus, the Justice Department did not participate in decree negotiations.
64. Some of these standards are stated in general terms: Placements must "assure the safety,
health, and well-being" of each resident and permit "reasonable access to. . . surrounding communi-
ties, geographically and socially." Consent Decree, CARC v. Thorne, at 6, § IV(B)(1)-(2). Others are
more specific: Placements must approximate "home-like" settings of no more than eight beds "unless
special circumstances exist," as defined therein. Id. at 6, § IV(B)(3).
65. The decree specifies that the system must accomplish at least the following: (1) ensure that
individual class members live, work, learn, and recreate in a humane physical and psychological envi-
ronment that affords the opportunity to interact with and participate in the community; (2) ensure
that class members are protected from harm; (3) review and monitor individual habilitation plans to
ensure that such plans are developed and are in fact implemented; (4) ensure that case managers and
providers have such training as is necessary to effectively and professionally discharge their responsi-
bilities under this order; (5) determine through an analysis of individual program data whether class
members are progressing or regressing in programs and services developed through this order; and (6)
periodically publish a report which shall be available to the public that discusses and analyzes the
data collected under (1) through (5). Id. at 7-8, § IV(E)(1)-(6).
66. In Southbury, supra note 53, negotiators for the state were willing to have representatives
from other groups with interest in the suit-e.g,, the Connecticut Association of Retarded Citizens
and the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Handicapped and Developmentally Dis-
abled Persons-participate in the enforcement of the decree. The Justice Department, however, was
not amenable to this suggestion. Griffith interview, supra note 61.
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sibilities to the federal government."7 Given the breadth of the decrees, the
government would need to be in the hospital, school, and each residential
"cottage" more often than not to ensure effective compliance. In reality,
however, monitors tend to visit the institutions infrequently."8 For moni-
toring to succeed, there needs to be an increased presence both on the
grounds of the institution and in any satellite facilities used to house
residents.
2. The Inability To Intervene
In an effort to change controversial provisions in consent decrees, pri-
vate advocacy groups have unsuccessfully tried to intervene in pending
suits.6 9 For example, in Southbury, three organizations tried to intervene
after the consent decree was submitted to the federal district court for
approval. The Home and School Association (H&S),7" CARC, and Pro-
tection and Advocacy (P&A) 1 all filed motions based on Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which delineates standards for "inter-
vention of right" and "permissive intervention" in actions pending before
the court. All three motions were denied. 2
67. The Southbury decree allows the federal government and its enforcement personnel "reasona-
ble access to the facilities, records, residents, and employees of the Southbury Training School upon
reasonable notice to the State for the purpose of ascertaining compliance with the Decree. Such access
shall continue until this Consent Decree is terminated." Consent Decree, Southbury, supra note 53, at
15, § VI(3). The Belle Chase decree contains identical wording. See Consent Decree, Belle Chase,
supra note 46, at 13, § VI(3). Wheat Ridge is less specific; it states merely that compliance "will be
monitored by the United States consistent with the Consent Decree . . . and with the principles set
forth in . . . this Agreement." Consent Decree, Wheat Ridge, supra note 44, at 8, § V. Rosewood is
similarly vague, focusing on the government's access to information and the receipt of compliance
reports from state officials. Rosewood, supra note 47, at 15, § VII(3)-(5).
68. Federal monitors, for example, have visited the Southbury Training School to review medical
practices only three times since the decree went into effect in July 1986. Interview with Dr. Jean
Gino, Medical Director of the Southbury Training School (Apr. 1988).
69. See Schwarzchild, supra note 45, at 914-23 & nn.166-67 (listing cases in which intervention
was denied); Note, Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 45, at 1036-37 (noting reluctance of
courts to allow intervention before decree is entered); Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Repre-
sentation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1480-81 (1982).
70. The Home and School Association is composed of parents of residents at the Southbury
Training School.
71. Protection and Advocacy's full title is "Office of Protection and Advocacy for Handicapped
and Developmentally Disabled Persons." The Office was established by the Connecticut General As-
sembly pursuant to the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6000-6002, 6012, 6021-6030, 6033, 6041-6064, 6081-6083 (1984). That Act is designed to help
individual states create systems "to protect the legal and human rights of persons with developmental
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 11 1984); see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 461-467; 42
U.S.C. § 6012 and regulations thereunder.
As an organization formed by congressional mandate to advocate for mentally handicapped citizens,
Protection & Advocacy is in an arguably stronger position than other proposed intervenors. It seems
contrary to congressional intent for courts to deny Protection & Advocacy access to CRIPA suits since
such participation would allow the Office to do exactly what it was intended to do: vindicate the rights
of mentally handicapped people.
72. See United States v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 1986) (order denying
intervention in pending action). The court had already denied P&A's right to intervene in the settle-
ment negotiations between the state and federal governments. P&A had argued that the Justice De-
partment had a duty under CRIPA to consult with it during negotiations, but the court rejected this
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To succeed in obtaining intervention of right, a petitioner must show an
"interest" in the action which may be adversely affected by the outcome of
the case and that the existing parties would not safeguard that interest. 8
The court did not dispute petitioners' interest in the case. It rejected, how-
ever, the claims of H&S and CARC that the decree's community place-
ment provisions jeopardized that interest in any way, for there was no
indication in the decree's proposed implementation plan that either organ-
ization would be unable to take part in decisions regarding the relocation
of residents." In fact, the proposed plan expressly provides for the input
of parents and advocates in the placement decision."'
However noteworthy, these promises of participation do not negate lan-
guage in the decree which ultimately invests full authority for making
placement decisions in the institution's professional staff.76 The Mansfield
decree, by contrast, recognized the primacy of parental input into the
placement decision. It required defendants to "give substantial weight to
the views of class members, as well as their parents or guardian, or closest
relative, who are actually involved, in the placement process."177 The ab-
sence of similar wording in the Southbury decree, together with the lack
of standards for community placement and subsequent quality assur-
ance," jeopardizes significantly petitioners' interest in this action.
Having demonstrated this potentially adverse effect on their interest,
petitioners were then required to demonstrate that the government's rep-
resentation was or may have been inadequate.7 Evidence of the danger
reading of the Act, holding that its statutory language "suggested] that only officials with authority to
bind the state need be involved in the negotiation process." Dober v. Meese, No. N-86-195(EBB), slip
op. at 5 (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 1986).
In the only other attempted intervention in a CRIPA suit involving the mentally retarded, the
district court denied the motion to intervene of five Fairview residents and all those similarly situated.
See United States v. Oregon, 86-961 LE (D. Or. Feb. 3, 1987) (order denying intervention because of
adequacy of government's representation and potential prejudice or delay such intervention might
cause). For a discussion of attempted intervention in the context of a CRIPA suit involving the men-
tally ill, see United States v. Massachusetts (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 1986) (order finding intervention
impermissible in any CRIPA suit).
73. Rule 24(a)(2) states that intervention as of right shall be granted
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties (emphasis added).
FED. R. Ctv. P. 24(a).
74. United States v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 1986) (order denying inter-
vention in pending action).
75. Id. (citing Proposed Consent Decree Implementation Plan at 62).
76. See supra text accompanying note 59.
77. See Consent Decree, CARC v. Thorne, No. H-78-653 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1983), at 4, § II(F).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
79. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (noting that Rule
24(a)(2) requires only that proposed intervenors show that representation of their interests "may be"
inadequate and that the showing required "should be ... minimal"); see also Shapiro, Some
Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 741
(1968) (issue of adequacy is always central to disposition of motion to intervene as of right). But see
Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1186 (1976) (once
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posed to the plaintiff class by the proposed decree80 satisfies this burden."
Thus, the court should have granted petitioners' intervention as of right.8 2
Petitioners also argued, in the alternative, for a right of permissive in-
tervention under Rule 24(b)(2). 3 The court denied H&S's motion for
failure to present "a question of law or fact in common" with the princi-
pal action; 4 it predicated the denial of relief to CARC and P&A, on the
other hand, on largely the same rationale as in the Rule 24(a) context: the
adequacy of the government's representation and the ability to pursue ad-
ditional claims in a separate action. 5 This reasoning is not in keeping
with the language of Rule 24(b), which emphasizes consideration of the
potential "delay" or "prejudice" caused by the proposed intervention.88
The court did not address these issues when discussing permissive inter-
vention, but petitioners argue that no delay or prejudice will result from
their participation.'
impairment of litigable interest is established, difficulty in finding adequate representation rarely bars
intervention). See generally Note, Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 45, at 1036-37 (gov-
ernment negotiated institutional reform decrees sometimes fail to protect third party interests ade-
quately); Schwarzchild, supra note 45, at 914-23.
Some courts have held that the demonstration of inadequacy must be especially clear when it is the
government that is challenged. See, e.g., Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C.
1966); United States v. ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Others have rejected this limitation.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1957); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Standard Oil, 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm,
301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
81. The court imposed a heavier burden that required petitioners to overcome a presumption of
adequate representation by "demonstrat[ing] that the government did not fairly and vigorously re-
present the public interest in negotiating the decree." Given the gravity of the decree's flaws, the court
was arguably incorrect in denying petitioners' motions in accordance with this standard.
82. Both H&S and CARC satisfied the test used by the First and Ninth Circuits to determine
whether existing parties adequately represented the intervenors' interests. They showed that their
interests were sufficiently divergent from those of the government that the latter was not likely to
argue their claim(s) and that their presence was therefore likely to "add some necessary element to the
proceedings which would not be covered by the parties in the suit." United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon,
696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1977)); see
also People v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing
Ninth Circuit's test).
83. Rule 24(b)(2) provides that such intervention will be permitted:
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. . . . In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
84. United States v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 1986) (order denying inter-
vention in pending action).
85. Id.
86. In this regard, Wright, Miller & Kane have noted that:
it seems most useful to rely on the discretion of the court in allowing permissive intervention.
If allowing the applicant to come into the case. . . will cause undue delay or prejudice to the
existing parties, he should not be allowed to intervene. . . . If these untoward results will not
occur, and allowing the would-be intervenor to come in and present his counterclaim would
avoid multiplicity of litigation or otherwise be desirable, intervention should be granted for this
purpose.
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1921 (2d
ed. 1986).
87. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene of CARC et al. at 8-9, Southbury,
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Moreover, as a matter of policy, the court should have exercised its
discretion to grant permissive intervention. It is fallacious to believe that
there is one "correct" conception of the best interests of retarded people."8
Given the heterogeneity of interests and concerns," it behooves the judge
to seek a diversity of perspectives before deciding what is in the best inter-
est of the plaintiff class.90
III. REMEDYING THE ACT
Congress designed CRIPA to give the Justice Department the authority
to initiate and vigorously pursue institutional reform. In general, however,
the government has followed a course of conciliatory inaction which has
produced, on several occasions, consent decrees which place the future
well-being of retarded citizens in jeopardy. When private organizations
have attempted to intervene on behalf the plaintiff class, they have been
unable to overcome CRIPA's presumption in favor of the adequacy of the
government's representation." While continuing to guarantee the federal
government's power to initiate and pursue legal action against state insti-
tutions for the retarded, the Act needs to specify stricter guidelines to be
followed in pursuit of such action.
A. The Initiation of Lawsuits
While the federal government has initiated actions by conducting insti-
tutional investigations, lengthy "conciliation" periods have attenuated fur-
ther progress.9 CRIPA should be amended to require the Justice Depart-
ment to bring suit93 after six months,94 if state officials fail to make
supra note 53 (arguing that while intervention may result in the consideration of certain additional
issues, proper remediation requires the participation of all concerned).
88. The government's response may also be influenced by political pressures which may not work
to the benefit of retarded citizens. Cf Note, Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 45, at 1034
(actions of defendant government may reflect its own concerns rather than the public interest).
89. Cf. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1291-92 (noting divergent interests of plaintiffs in institutional reform litiga-
tion); Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q. 37
(1982).
90. See Shapiro, supra note 79, at 745-46, 748; Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-For-
ward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21 (1979); cf. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505 (1941) (rejecting argument that Rule 24(a) lists "a comprehensive
inventory of the allowable instances for intervention" and holding that intervention on other grounds
may be required in public interest).
91. See United States v. Connecticut, No. N-86-252 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 1986) (order denying
intervention which finds presumption of adequacy of government's representation in CRIPA suits); cf
United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 556 F. Supp. 357, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983) (Rule 24(a) contains implied presumption of adequacy of
government representation in context of antitrust consent decrees).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
93. Filing suit does not preclude continued negotiations. As the legislative history of CRIPA
makes clear, one of the primary benefits of filing suit is acceleration of the process of negotiation and
settlement. See supra text accompanying note 42.
94. Once suit is filed, it should be vigorously enforced. The Justice Department's conduct in the
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measurable progress within this period in redressing Romeo violations"
found at the institution." Six months seems an appropriate time period,97
given the government's recent action in Fort Stanton.98 Less than six
months after notifying the Governor of New Mexico of the results of its
investigation, the Justice Department filed suit, believing that state offi-
cials had had a reasonable period to correct the constitutionally offensive
conditions.9"
At the conclusion of first six-month remedial period, another would be-
gin during which the state would have to implement its proposed strategy.
If it failed to do so, the Justice Department then would be required to
initiate legal action.100 This proposal does not require the state to redress
two suits brought to date against institutions for the retarded does not indicate consistently vigorous
enforcement. Fort Stanton, for example, remains in the discovery phase more than a year after suit
was filed. This result may be explained in part by the change of administration in New Mexico.
Telephone interview with Verlin Hughes, Staff Attorney, Special Litigation Division, Department of
Justice (Oct. 1987),
In Fairview, conversely, the time period for discovery has been extended by a flurry of motions filed
mostly by the state. The Justice Department has prevailed in most instances. United States v. Oregon,
No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. Oct. 7, 1986) (order denying defendant's motion for a more definite state-
ment); United States v. Oregon, No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. Jan. 26, 1987) (order upholding plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery); United States v. Oregon, No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. Feb. 3, 1987) (order
denying motion to intervene of five Fairview residents and those similarly situated); United States v.
Oregon, No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. Apr. 7, 1987) (order denying defendant's motion for partial judg-
ment on pleadings); United States v. Oregon, No. 86-961 LE (D. Or. April 7, 1987) (order upholding
in part and rejecting in part defendant's motion to compel discovery); United States v. Oregon, No.
86-961 LE (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1987) (order denying defendant's counterclaim for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
96. To meet this "measurable progress" standard, the state would need to submit a proposal
outlining its strategy for redressing the alleged constitutional violations in staffing, programming, re-
cordkeeping and other relevant areas. The state's proposal would in effect be an abbreviated, skeletal
model of the consent decree implementation plan currently submitted after the decree is entered by the
court. The Justice Department would decide if the proposal constituted a "good faith" effort to re-
spond to the "49-day letter."
97. The six-month provision would not contravene any of the language currently contained in the
Act; it would simply clarify § 1997b(a)(2)(C) which requires the Attorney General to ensure that
state officials have had "reasonable time to take appropriate action to correct such conditions and
pattern or practice."
98. Six months is too long to wait if the government's investigation uncovers a pattern of life-
threatening conditions or abuses at a facility. In such cases, the Justice Department should bring suit
immediately. This brand of emergency relief has precedent in Wyatt, where, during negotiations, the
district judge ordered immediate correction of fire safety violations which posed an imminent threat to
the safety of residents at the facilities under investigation. Interview with Charles R. Halpern, Coun-
sel for Plaintiffs in Wyatt v. Stickney (Nov. 1987).
99. Memorandum from Win. Bradford Reynolds to Attorney General Meese (July 25, 1986) (on
file with author). Fort Stanton is a small facility and is admittedly easier to rehabilitate than some-
thing the size of Rosewood or Southbury. Still, it does not seem unreasonable to ask for some measure
of progress within this time period.
100. As an alternative to government-initiated action, CRIPA could expressly provide for attor-
ney's fees to intervenors who brought suit against the state for failure to meet the statutory require-
ments of the Act. Such a proposal would effectively extend the scope of the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), which already provides for fee awards to private
parties who successfully bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note
89, at 1279 (noting that in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, plaintiffs' counsel
received fee award of $613,992).
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all deficiencies within this second period;1"1 it merely mandates that the
state make some progress in this direction such that the Justice Depart-
ment can be assured that suit need not be filed to compel action. 02
B. Ensuring Adequate Representation
The state and the federal government could negotiate a decree, as in
Southbury, which fails to vindicate the rights of the plaintiff class.1 08
CRIPA, therefore, must be amended to ensure that before a decree is en-
tered, the court has had the opportunity to hear the full range of perspec-
tives on the proposed decree. This goal could be accomplished by inserting
a provision requiring that before a decree is entered by the court, there be
fairness hearings 0 4 where plaintiff-intervenors and amici curiae can pre-
sent their claims and dispute any part of the decree which they find unac-
ceptable.1 05 At the conclusion of the hearings, the judge may accept the
original decree or request that it be modified in accordance with sugges-
tions and concerns she has heard. In the latter case, she would order the
101. Such a requirement would be untenable since state legislatures would be unlikely to author-
ize necessary increases in funding until they were judicially bound to do so by a consent decree. It is
possible, however, for state governments to redress structural problems not tied to funding shortages,
such as inadequate recordkeeping and poor delivery of medical services, and these problems constitute
a majority of those in need of redress. Telephone interview with Robin Frohboese, Staff Attorney,
Special Litigation Division, Department of Justice (Oct. 1987).
102. The argument that this proposal would lead to an explosion of litigation, and thus drain the
Justice Department's resources, assumes erroneously that filing suit is synonymous with going to trial.
Faced with the specter of full-scale litigation, states are likely to increase efforts to negotiate a settle-
ment, realizing that the Justice Department would not bring charges in the first place without conclu-
sive evidence of CRIPA violations. The state, moreover, will be notified of the breadth of the govern-
ment's evidence in the "49-day letter." Thus, going to trial makes sense only if the state feels it can
successfully challenge the adequacy of this evidence. This result is sufficiently unlikely to dispel con-
cerns about the expense of implementing the six-month provision.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
104. This proposal would effectively extend FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) governing judicial approval of
class action suits to suits brought by the Justice Department under CRIPA. Accordingly, the judge
would use the hearings to ensure that the decree was fair, reasonable, and adequate before she signed
it into law. For a similar proposal in the school desegregation context, see Note, Participation and
Department of Justice School Desegregation Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1829-34 (1986).
105. Opponents of such hearings would emphasize their cost and the resultant delay in the resolu-
tion of the case. As for cost, while it is true that the court would be required to hear testimony on a
decree it may consider acceptable as originally drafted, the hearings might uncover problems that have
gone unnoticed. If hearings had been held on the Southbury decree, for example, the district judge
might have rejected its treatment of community placement and insisted on more substantial monitor-
ing, in light of concerns raised by proposed intervenors' testimony.
As for problem of delay, it is true that the decree could not be entered by the court until the
hearings were concluded, but the potential delay caused by the present procedure is even greater.
Motions to intervene may currently be filed only after a proposed decree is submitted to the court,
thus delaying the resolution of the case. In Southbury, for example, the decree was submitted by the
litigating parties in July 1986, at which time three motions were filed. The court did not dismiss the
motions until some five months later, before which time it could not enter the decree. The proposed
amendment would not allow for such delays. To satisfy the "timeliness' requirement, motions to
intervene would need to be filed while negotiations were in progress, not after their conclusion. See
NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973) (timeliness is first requirement movant must meet to
intervene successfully); Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586, 593
(1980) (same); see also Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 270 (1st Cir. 1985) (timeliness assessed in
part by length of time intervenors knew or should have known of their interest before petitioning).
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litigating parties, i.e. the state and federal governments, to recast the docu-
ment;10 6 if they failed to do so in accordance with her instructions, she
could reformulate the unacceptable parts of the decree herself and prevent
any further governmental participation in the process.
The benefits to be gained from intervention will be lost if judges deny
legitimate motions to intervene. CRIPA should thus be amended to afford
a statutory right of intervention to any agency or organization which
meets the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, minus the language about the adequacy of representation by
existing parties.1"' There is ample evidence of the danger of allowing one
party to represent the interests of a group as vulnerable as the retarded,
and of the particular failures of the federal government in this regard. 08
Thus, it is important to fashion CRIPA so as to allow those with demon-
strated interests to be heard, while not unduly delaying the adjudicatory
process. This proposal satisfies both requirements. 0 9
C. Monitoring the Settlement
The Act should also be amended to include an independent monitoring
body, 110 since the Justice Department's physical absence from the institu-
tion makes it unable to carry out its monitoring responsibilities effec-
tively."' Various schemes used in prior institutional litigation have met
with varying degrees of success;" 2 the monitoring proposal put in place
106. To allow all parties of interest to participate in this remedial phase would unduly delay the
process of negotiation and is unnecessary since the litigating parties would be constrained to reform
the decree within the parameters specified by the judge.
107. Thus, the intervenor must "claim an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action" and be "so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." Liberalizing intervention in this manner
will allow diverse viewpoints to be voiced. See Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need
for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1979); Weinstein,
Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions-Some Views on Participation, 13
U.C. DAVis L. REv. 231, 241 (1980).
108. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
109. Allowing such broad participation would not unduly delay adjudication since the time period
for conducting hearings would be statutorily limited, and intervenors would be excluded from the
actual negotiation of the decrees.
110. As one expert in the field noted, "nothing happens without monitoring." Interview with
Michael Lottman, Executive Director of the Mansfield Review Panel (CARC v. Thorne) (Nov.
1987).
111. See supra text accompanying note 68.
112. Wyatt v. Stickney established a "Human Rights Committee" of seven non-experts in mental
retardation to supervise the decree concerning Partlow State Hospital. 344 F. Supp. 387, 394, 407
(M.D. Ala. 1972). The committee was not, however, very effective; its members worked part-time
only, lacked the resources and expertise to monitor the institution effectively, and were not given the
authority to translate transgressions into punishment. See Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees:
Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 MENTAL DISAminLTy L. REP. 69, 71-72 (1976).
Knowledge of the difficulties at Partlow informed the creation of a "review panel" at Willowbrook.
See generally id. at 72-74. The seven-member staff was assigned three full-time assistants and was
granted access to all facilities and files necessary to judge compliance. Id. at 72-73 (citing New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children and Parisi v. Carey, No. 72-C-356/357 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,
1975)). The panel was also given the power to enforce recommendations when made pursuant to the
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under CRIPA should draw on these experiences. It should ensure, for
example, that monitors have access to all buildings and files necessary to
judge compliance. Monitors should also be full-time employees, paid by
the federal government, so that they are available to inspect conditions at
the institution on a day-to-day basis and visit community placements,
where necessary.11 3
It is impractical to choose monitors who have had no experience with
the mentally retarded. Their lack of expertise would necessitate the hiring
of an additional staff of consultants which would both escalate the overall
cost of monitoring and complicate its execution.1 14 In addition to having
experience in the retardation field, monitors should be chosen, where pos-
sible, who have a demonstrated personal interest in the decree. Fortu-
nately, the court has ready access to such individuals in the form of plain-
tiff-intervenors who have presumably participated in hearings on the
proposed decree. Each intervenor, and the litigating parties, should be al-
lowed one representative on the monitoring panel. 15 This procedure
would guarantee that those assigned monitoring duties would have exten-
sive experience with the consent decree and the institution benefitted by it,
as well as a history of advocacy for or service 1 ' to the retarded. 1 7
The monitoring body would report any evidence of noncompliance to a
Special Master 1 " invested with the authority to compel the state to mod-
ify its behavior when he was sufficiently convinced that it was violating
the decree.119 In making such a determination, the Master would allow
fulfillment of provisions in the decree. Id. at 73.
While an improvement, the Willowbrook panel had problems. The state often objected to its recom-
mendations and the subsequent judicial review was usually protracted. The attendant lack of progress
caused parents and advocacy groups to become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the
panel. See id.
113. Hiring full-time monitors would increase the cost of monitoring, but such expense would not
be borne indefinitely; the decrees typically expire after two years at which time monitoring ceases.
The temporary cost is essential, moreover, to the effective implementation of decrees. The value of a
remedy diminishes substantially in the absence of a mechanism to safeguard its provisions.
114. Maintaining two separate bodies, one with the expertise and the other with authority, would
be an inefficient and illogical division of responsibility.
115. There should be flexibility, however, in the size of the monitoring body given the variation in
the size of institutions. Where the number of monitors, calculated as specified in this proposal, is, in
the judgment of the court, inadequate to meet the needs of the situation, the court should appoint
additional monitors or, if it prefers, assign responsibility for appointing additional monitors equally to
the litigating parties. There is no danger in allowing the Justice Department to participate in moni-
toring in this way since other parties will be present to dilute any bias it might introduce.
116. Such interest has been demonstrated by unions, as when District 1199 intervened in CARG
v. Thorne, No. H-78-653 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1983).
117. Given the diversity of perspectives on the panel, unanimous support for any given decree
provision is likely to be a rare occurrence. This, however, should not hinder enforcement, for there
will always be some monitors sufficiently in favor of a provision to ensure compliance.
118. The court in Wyatt v. Stickney reserved the power to appoint a master but never did so. 344
F. Supp. 373, 376-77 (M.D. Ala. 1972); 344 F. Supp. 387, 392-93 (M.D. Ala. 1972); see Lottman,
supra note 112, at 71.
119. The court may invest the master with such power under FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c): "The order
of reference [from the judge] to the master may specify or limit his powers .... Subject to the specifi-
cations and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all
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both the state and the panel to present evidence of compliance with the
decree, or lack thereof, in a formal hearing. At the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, he would render a decision and file it with the clerk of the court,
in fulfillment of Rule 53(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 120 If
the state objected to the Master's holding, it would be free to appeal the
ruling in federal district court. 21
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for reform of institutions for retarded citizens is as great to-
day as it was in 1980 when Congress enacted CRIPA. The federal gov-
ernment not only has a role to play in this process, it has a responsibility
to defend those citizens who are unable to seek redress of constitutional
rights denied them. The government's performance over the past seven
years has been far from exemplary in this regard. Legislative changes are
necessary to augment the Justice Department's efforts and accomplish at
last the goals of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.
proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper
for the efficient performance of his duties under the order." For a discussion of the use of special
masters in the institutional reform context, see Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF
CHILDREN 345 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985) (appointment of special master is "an extraordinary and
rarely exercised judicial power"). But see Horowitz, supra note 89, at 1275-76, 1300 (increased
delegation of judicial responsibility to special masters in 1980's). See generally Fiss, supra note 90, at
56-57; Kirp & Babcock,Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and
Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313 (1981); Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A
Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399, 407-12
(1981).
120. Rule 53(e)(1) provides: "The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference and, if required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall
set them forth in the report. He shall then file the report with the clerk of the court .... "
121. Special masters are hardly novel in institutional reform litigation, but their main application
to date has been in the prison context. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La.
1970), 1 PRISON L. RPTR. 185 (May 1972); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La.
1972). See generally Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Smithson,
The Special Master in Correctional Cases: A Preliminary Survey, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 15
(1975).
The one notable use of a special master in the context of institutions for retarded people came in
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The Pennhurst
Master, however, was not invested with powers nearly as broad as those advocated here. Her Office
had basically three responsibilities: to formulate compliance plans and timetables, to plan the training
of personnel to carry out those plans, and to monitor the defendants' adherence to those plans. Id. at
1326-27. The Master thus did not have the authority to issue remedial orders; in fact, she did not
even accept the power granted to her by the court to initiate compliance plans, feeling that the defend-
ants were better able to do so than she since they were better aware of their resources and capabilities.
She felt that her job was merely to review the plan they had formulated. Burt, supra note 119, at 346.
